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The	failure	of	the	left	to	grasp	Brexit
The	Labour	party	was	eventually	persuaded	to	back	a	second	referendum.	This	was	a	historic	mistake	which	led	to
defeat	in	the	General	Election,	says	Michael	Wilkinson	(LSE).	Labour	should	have	respected	the	vote	to	Leave
and	offered	a	platform	for	change	based	on	a	future	outside	of	the	European	Union.
Thursday’s	General	Election	was	a	bad	day	for	the	Labour	party.	It	spelled	the	end	of	Remainism	and	signalled	a
historic	defeat	for	the	left.	There	needs	to	be	serious	reflection	on	all	of	this	because	the	repercussions	are	severe
and	wide-ranging,	and	broader	lessons	must	be	learned,	not	just	for	the	UK	but	elsewhere.	It	turned	out,	contrary	to
much	expert	assessment,	that	the	2016	referendum	was,	in	fact,	binding.	The	left	failed	to	grasp	this,	and	the
underlying	disconnect	it	signified.
A	Labour	rally	in	Glasgow	in	December	2019.	Photo:	Jeremy	Corbyn	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence
Two	initial	responses	have	been	predominant,	some	blaming	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	leadership,	others	focusing	on	Brexit
itself.	The	truth	is	that	both	are	to	blame	–	they	cannot	be	disaggregated,	since	Corbyn	ultimately	has	to	take
responsibility	for	capitulating	to	the	promise	of	a	second	referendum.	If	any	further	evidence	were	needed	in	Labour
heartlands	that	its	leadership	represented	just	another	version	of	a	metropolitan	elite	that	has	become	so	utterly
distrusted,	this	was	it.	John	McDonnell’s	rapprochement	with	New	Labour’s	Alastair	Campbell	and	his	explicit
embrace	of	Remain	was	a	moment	that	will	live	long	in	the	memory.
The	disconnect	between	the	Labour	party	and	working	class	voters	of	course	reflects	a	decline	taking	place	not
over	months,	or	years,	but	decades.	It	has	no	easy	fix.	But	the	irony	is	that	within	the	Labour	party,	Corbyn	was
almost	uniquely	placed	to	put	his	weight	behind	a	‘Lexit’	agenda,	his	lifelong	Euroscepticism	giving	him	a	credibility
that	was	simply	never	utilised,	undermined	when	he	decided	to	campaign	for	Remain	in	2016	and	effectively
abandoned	through	further	concessions	to	the	Remainers	both	inside	and	outside	the	party.	The	tragedy,	in	short,
is	that	Corbyn,	and	many	of	those	around	him,	have	gone	down	fighting	for	a	cause	they	didn’t	believe	in.
The	result	was	clearly	bad	for	the	Labour	party,	which,	after	doing	unexpectedly	well	in	2017	–	attaining	40%	of	the
electorate	on	a	socialist	platform	and	with	the	promise	to	respect	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	–	fell	to	around
32%	of	the	vote,	with	a	similar	programme	but	revoking	its	Brexit	promise.	Although	the	scale	of	defeat	has	been
grossly	exaggerated	(Labour	got	more	votes	than	under	Ed	Miliband	in	2015,	Gordon	Brown	in	2010	and	Tony	Blair
in	2005),	it	can	only	be	described	as	a	failure.	If	this	spells	the	official	end	of	Corbyn,	in	truth,	‘Corbynism’	was
already	over	once	Labour	capitulated	to	its	Remain	wing	on	Brexit,	effectively	giving	Labour	Leave	voters	little
option	but	to	defect	to	the	Tories	or	the	Brexit	Party	or	to	simply	abstain.	In	the	end,	Labour	lost	a	quarter	of	its
Leave	voters	to	Conservatives	and	52	out	of	the	54	seats	it	lost	in	England	and	Wales	were	in	Leave-voting
constituencies.
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The	concessions	to	Remain	were	presumably	made	in	part	due	to	internal	pressures	and	in	part	on	the	basis	of
some	electoral	calculation,	the	fear	of	losing	votes	to	the	Liberal	Democrats	eclipsing	concern	over	defection	to	the
Tories	or	the	Brexit	Party.	The	apparent	preponderance	of	Remainers	in	Labour	and	amongst	Corbynistas
themselves,	along	with	the	influence	of	groups	such	as	Another	Europe	is	Possible,	meant	Corbyn	was	essentially
fighting	with	one	hand	tied	behind	his	back.	From	this	angle,	Corbyn’s	position	might	have	been	justified	as	an
attempt	to	perform	an	increasingly	precarious	balancing	act.
But	a	balancing	act	was	not	what	was	required.	The	scales	had	already	been	weighed;	Remain	had	lost	in	2016.
This	is	such	a	simple	point	it	seems	extraordinary	that	it	could	have	been	lost	from	sight.	No	doubt,	the	fear	of
losing	seats	to	the	Lib	Dems	was	real.	But	the	real	shock	from	this	election	is	the	complete	failure	of	Remain	as	an
electoral	strategy,	not	only	for	Labour	but	for	the	Lib	Dems,	who	had	turned	themselves	into	a	single-issue,	‘stop
Brexit’	party	but	reaped	scant	reward.
If	the	decisive	victory	of	Boris	Johnson	spells	the	end	of	Remainism,	it	does	not,	however,	present	an	obvious	path
forward.	Johnson’s	victory	was	not	based	on	a	surge	of	enthusiasm,	the	Tories	achieving	only	one	percentage	point
more	than	under	Theresa	May.	The	apparent	success	of	Johnson’s	slogan	of	‘Get	Brexit	Done’	is	matched	only	by
its	emptiness.	It	is	unclear	that	Johnson’s	Tory	party	has	a	plan	of	any	political	substance,	which	is	not	to	doubt	the
substantial	damage	it	may	do.	And	if	the	path	to	leaving	the	EU	is	now	open	as	a	matter	of	parliamentary	arithmetic,
obstacles	lie	ahead,	not	least	the	issue	of	Scottish	independence.
The	historic	defeat	of	the	left	is	a	more	difficult	proposition	to	outline	because	it	requires	a	deeper	excavation	of	the
underlying	materials.	The	first	and	most	straightforward	point	is	that	there	was	a	near-total	failure	of	leadership	on
the	left	either	to	prepare	for	Brexit,	or	less	excusably,	after	the	referendum,	to	take	advantage	of	the	opportunity
that	it	provided.	By	2019,	a	left	programme	that	took	exit	seriously	had	three	years	to	mature	–	not	on	a	speculative
terrain,	but	on	a	terrain	primed	by	the	electorate	against	political	and	economic	elites,	a	once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity	for	a	rupture	from	the	status	quo.	The	failure	is	all	the	more	extraordinary	given	that	over	the	last
decade	since	the	financial	crisis,	across	Europe,	and	further	afield,	the	conjuncture	has	delivered	up	the	slow-
motion	collapse	of	social	democratic	parties	attached	to	EU-style	centrism.	It	is	astonishing	that	the	same	Left	that
witnessed	the	total	capitulation	and	then	defeat	of	Syriza	could,	with	some	notable	exceptions,	have	evaded	this
historic	task.
The	Labour	Party	has	avoided	Pasokification,	no	doubt	partly	due	to	the	UK’s	electoral	system,	but	also	due	to	the
robust	social	movements	that	have	grown	inside	it.	But	there	is	the	temptation	now	by	some	on	the	left	to	double
down	on	the	disconnect	from	working	class	communities,	dismissing	the	electorate	as	ignorant,	stupid	or	simply
racist.	Apart	from	the	folly	of	that	position	in	terms	of	constructing	a	viable	opposition	moving	forward,	it	overlooks
the	fact	that	this	dismissal	had	already	occurred,	sealed	with	the	promise	of	a	second	referendum,	writing	off	half
the	electorate	at	a	stroke	–	and	possibly	many	more	when	adding	in	Remain	voters	who	think	the	outcome	of	the
first	should	have	been	respected.
There	is	a	counter-argument,	which	points	out	that	class	is	now	more	complex,	and	that	a	Lexit	position	would
alienate	a	new	core	of	the	young,	urban,	cosmopolitan	Labour	support.	There	are	a	number	of	problems	with	this
argument,	even	assuming	it	is	based	on	accurate	assumptions.	Most	concrete	is	the	electoral	arithmetic,	which
suggests	that	a	position	to	respect	the	referendum	could	have	cost	some	seats	to	the	Lib	Dems,	but	would	have
saved	far	more	from	the	Tories.	More	fundamentally,	this	appeal	to	identity	politics	is	a	dead	end	for	the	left	–	not
least	with	the	problematic	conflation	of	a	Remain	identity,	however	real	that	may	be,	with	a	simplistic	desire	to
overturn	a	referendum.	Most	basic	of	all,	however,	is	that	remaining	in	the	EU	should	be	understood	for	what	it	is	–
remaining	in	a	neoliberal	straitjacket,	a	regressive	polity	that	not	only	suffers	from	all	the	defects	of	its	various
Member	States	but	aggravates	them	through	structural	democratic	deficits.
The	condensed	diagnosis	of	this	conjuncture	is	that	Labour	appears	to	have	forgotten	the	democratic	part	of
democratic	socialism.	Not	only	in	the	trivial	sense,	of	failing	to	respect	a	democratic	mandate.	But	in	the	more
complex	sense	of	assuming	that	the	electorate,	and	particularly	the	working	class,	understood	in	all	its	complexity,
could	simply	be	bought	off	by	a	top-down	socialism	rather	than	advancing	through	their	own	political	empowerment.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	first	appeared
at	Verfassungsblog.
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